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In the first part of the 20th century, Alex-
andre Kojève stands out as one of the key 
interpretors of the social dimensions of 
Phenomenology of Spirit, and more pre-
cisely, of the idea of reciprocal recogni-
tion: the heart of Hegel’s social ethics. By 
opposing Kojève’s interpretation of this 
question, Molly Farneth is trying to paint 
a different picture: one where reciprocal 
recognition does not end stuck in a perma-
nent state of masterdom and servitude, but 
where this state can be overcome through 
confession and forgiveness. The figures of 
that process are not two consciousnesses 
striving for recognition from which the 
paradigmatic figures of Master and Slave 
appear, but the wicked and judging con-
sciousnesses which come to terms with 
each other by means of “rituals of confes-
sion and forgiveness through which their 
ongoing conflict might be mediated” (p. 
58). From this point of view, Hegel’s ethics 
finally arrives at the point where conflicts 
can be solved not through domination and 
submission but mutual recognition. 
The book is divided into seven chapters, 
which can be (as the author points out at 
end of chapter one) separated into three 
parts. The first part (chapter one, entitled 
“Social ethics in Hegel’s Phenomenology of 
Spirit”) serves as the introduction to the 
main goals of the book and explores the 
stances and contradictions in the differ-
ent earlier readings of Hegel. The author 
attempts to introduce Hegel’s social ethics 
as something not secondary to his episte-
mological project but, quite the opposite, 
essential to its understanding.
The second part (chapters two to five) 
is an attempt of re-reading certain parts 
of Hegel’s Phenomenology (on Antigone, 
Faith and Enlightenment, Wicked and Judg-
ing consciousness) in a new way. Chapter 
two, “Tragedy and Social Construction of 
Norms”, and chapter three, “Culture War 
and Appeal to Authority”, both discuss 
the shapes of spirit that “collapse under 
the inadequacies of its beliefs and prac-
tices” (p. 97). “Rituals of Reconciliation”, 
chapter four, deals with the relationship 
between the figures of wicked and judging 
consciousness, as well as analogies between 
Lutheran theology and Hegel’s account of 
confession and forgiveness. The next chap-
ter, “Religion, Philosophy and the Abso-
lute”, further reflects on the relationships 
between social practices and norms. 
Finally, the third part (chapters six and 
seven, “Commitment, Conversation, and 
Contestation” and “Democratic Authority 
through Conflict and Reconciliation”) have 
a more “practical” purpose: it explores how 
we can apply this interpretation of He-
gel’s social ethics in mitigating conflicts, 
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contradictions or problems in societies of 
today’s world (such as the abortion debate 
or religious differences inside communi-
ties). There is no avoidance of conflict nor 
perfect and just laws that will free us from 
the burdens of politics (p. 128). Instead, 
Farneth recommends, as an alternative, 
the dialectic of democracy: an endless me-
diation without closure that cultivates the 
practices of reciprocal recognition and that 
avoids, by recognizing each other as the 
loci of authority, the burdens of partisan 
conflict, culture wars and tragedy. Such a 
reading not only sheds new light on He-
gel’s social ethics but also gives valuable 
insights to new ways through which we 
can attempt to overcome conflicts in to-
day’s diverse societies.
